| Zone (*) | DNSSEC - Informations |
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Zone: (root)
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(root)
| 1 DS RR published
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| DS with Algorithm 8, KeyTag 20326, DigestType 2 and Digest 4G1EuAuPHTmpXAsNfGXQhFjogECbvGg0VxBCN8f47I0=
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| • Status: Valid because published
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| 3 DNSKEY RR found
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| Public Key with Algorithm 8, KeyTag 20326, Flags 257 (SEP = Secure Entry Point)
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| Public Key with Algorithm 8, KeyTag 21831, Flags 256
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| Public Key with Algorithm 8, KeyTag 38696, Flags 257 (SEP = Secure Entry Point)
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| 1 RRSIG RR to validate DNSKEY RR found
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| RRSIG-Owner (root), Algorithm: 8, 0 Labels, original TTL: 172800 sec, Signature-expiration: 03.03.2026, 00:00:00 +, Signature-Inception: 10.02.2026, 00:00:00 +, KeyTag 20326, Signer-Name: (root)
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| • Status: Good - Algorithmus 8 and DNSKEY with KeyTag 20326 used to validate the DNSKEY RRSet
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| • Status: Valid Chain of trust. Parent-DS with Algorithm 8, KeyTag 20326, DigestType 2 and Digest "4G1EuAuPHTmpXAsNfGXQhFjogECbvGg0VxBCN8f47I0=" validates local Key with the same values, Key ist Secure Entry Point (SEP) of the zone
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Zone: ca
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ca
| 1 DS RR in the parent zone found
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| DS with Algorithm 13, KeyTag 26384, DigestType 2 and Digest d+oR0r5Yy7pYv47NYPTH5y0f6zG1mT58VYCUQMtfeLA=
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| 1 RRSIG RR to validate DS RR found
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| RRSIG-Owner ca., Algorithm: 8, 1 Labels, original TTL: 86400 sec, Signature-expiration: 26.02.2026, 05:00:00 +, Signature-Inception: 13.02.2026, 04:00:00 +, KeyTag 21831, Signer-Name: (root)
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| • Status: Good - Algorithmus 8 and DNSKEY with KeyTag 21831 used to validate the DS RRSet in the parent zone
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| 3 DNSKEY RR found
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| Public Key with Algorithm 13, KeyTag 26384, Flags 257 (SEP = Secure Entry Point)
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| Public Key with Algorithm 13, KeyTag 46762, Flags 256
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| Public Key with Algorithm 13, KeyTag 59817, Flags 256
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| 1 RRSIG RR to validate DNSKEY RR found
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| RRSIG-Owner ca., Algorithm: 13, 1 Labels, original TTL: 3600 sec, Signature-expiration: 18.02.2026, 19:59:02 +, Signature-Inception: 12.02.2026, 04:34:49 +, KeyTag 26384, Signer-Name: ca
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| • Status: Good - Algorithmus 13 and DNSKEY with KeyTag 26384 used to validate the DNSKEY RRSet
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| • Status: Valid Chain of trust. Parent-DS with Algorithm 13, KeyTag 26384, DigestType 2 and Digest "d+oR0r5Yy7pYv47NYPTH5y0f6zG1mT58VYCUQMtfeLA=" validates local Key with the same values, Key ist Secure Entry Point (SEP) of the zone
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Zone: stalkedbyfeds.ca
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stalkedbyfeds.ca
| 0 DS RR in the parent zone found
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| DS-Query in the parent zone has a valid NSEC3 RR as result with the hashed query name "m0ng8k5adq3hu2fqo85u2slvcaj585fr" between the hashed NSEC3-owner "m0n8n929n0vnma0vfs53fggujb98a94l" and the hashed NextOwner "m0oh7vf1q07cvsetvcfss011lh6eh3nm". So the parent zone confirmes the not-existence of a DS RR.
Bitmap: NS, DS, RRSIG Validated: RRSIG-Owner m0n8n929n0vnma0vfs53fggujb98a94l.ca., Algorithm: 13, 2 Labels, original TTL: 3600 sec, Signature-expiration: 19.02.2026, 09:14:31 +, Signature-Inception: 12.02.2026, 08:04:59 +, KeyTag 46762, Signer-Name: ca
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| DS-Query in the parent zone sends valid NSEC3 RR with the Hash "r66k981mhm0vmpsgv1djat7janroai95" as Owner. That's the Hash of "ca" with the NextHashedOwnerName "r66pg9pttik20okt0j69v3is2m57vek9". So that domain name is the Closest Encloser of "stalkedbyfeds.ca". Opt-Out: True.
Bitmap: NS, SOA, RRSIG, DNSKEY, NSEC3PARAM Validated: RRSIG-Owner r66k981mhm0vmpsgv1djat7janroai95.ca., Algorithm: 13, 2 Labels, original TTL: 3600 sec, Signature-expiration: 18.02.2026, 23:44:20 +, Signature-Inception: 12.02.2026, 08:04:59 +, KeyTag 46762, Signer-Name: ca
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| The ClosestEncloser says, that "*.ca" with the Hash "78lu5s72fn6up7j73hrchvcj3mv553id" is a possible Wildcard of the DS Query Name. But the DS-Query in the parent zone sends a valid NSEC3 RR With the owner "78lebj5fsc08j7govnfiu7mcntrs71ql" and the Next Owner "78lvf8teifk8dcnijgb6vlk41qd3u6po", so the Hash of the wildcard is between these hashes. So that NSEC3 proves the Not-existence of that wildcard expansion. Opt-Out: True
Bitmap: NS, DS, RRSIG Validated: RRSIG-Owner 78lebj5fsc08j7govnfiu7mcntrs71ql.ca., Algorithm: 13, 2 Labels, original TTL: 3600 sec, Signature-expiration: 19.02.2026, 17:22:06 +, Signature-Inception: 12.02.2026, 08:04:59 +, KeyTag 46762, Signer-Name: ca
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Zone: www.stalkedbyfeds.ca
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www.stalkedbyfeds.ca
| 0 DS RR in the parent zone found
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| DS-Query in the parent zone sends valid NSEC3 RR with the Hash "r66k981mhm0vmpsgv1djat7janroai95" as Owner. That's the Hash of "ca" with the NextHashedOwnerName "r66pg9pttik20okt0j69v3is2m57vek9". So that domain name is the Closest Encloser of "www.stalkedbyfeds.ca". Opt-Out: True.
Bitmap: NS, SOA, RRSIG, DNSKEY, NSEC3PARAM Validated: RRSIG-Owner r66k981mhm0vmpsgv1djat7janroai95.ca., Algorithm: 13, 2 Labels, original TTL: 3600 sec, Signature-expiration: 18.02.2026, 23:44:20 +, Signature-Inception: 12.02.2026, 08:04:59 +, KeyTag 46762, Signer-Name: ca
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| The ClosestEncloser says, that "*.ca" with the Hash "78lu5s72fn6up7j73hrchvcj3mv553id" is a possible Wildcard of the DS Query Name. But the DS-Query in the parent zone sends a valid NSEC3 RR With the owner "78lebj5fsc08j7govnfiu7mcntrs71ql" and the Next Owner "78lvf8teifk8dcnijgb6vlk41qd3u6po", so the Hash of the wildcard is between these hashes. So that NSEC3 proves the Not-existence of that wildcard expansion. Opt-Out: True
Bitmap: NS, DS, RRSIG Validated: RRSIG-Owner 78lebj5fsc08j7govnfiu7mcntrs71ql.ca., Algorithm: 13, 2 Labels, original TTL: 3600 sec, Signature-expiration: 19.02.2026, 17:22:06 +, Signature-Inception: 12.02.2026, 08:04:59 +, KeyTag 46762, Signer-Name: ca
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